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ABSTRACT: Shortfalls and inefficiencies in traditional planning
and campaigning have become increasingly clear in the current
hyperconnected security environment. US military planners can
mitigate these deficiencies by embracing integrated planning
and campaigning approaches including the development of new
organizational structures and processes. These improvements will
give senior leaders increased options as the US military and US
Allies and partners address complex problems with better effect and
to greater advantage.

O

ver the last two decades, rapid advances in information
technologies, the hyperconnected world these technologies
have created, and the reach and power of the narratives they
convey have driven significant changes in the global security arena.
Adversaries excel at leveraging these technologies and tools with few legal
and ethical constraints and restraints. Further, these adversaries are willing
to play the long game, betting they can outlast what they see as a tired
and strategically impatient and incoherent America. Legacy planning and
campaigning tools are largely ineffective in a competition space defined
by hyperconnectedness, the ubiquity of information, narrative warfare
including disinformation and misinformation, and the democratization
of access to the means and ways of information power.1 Moreover, the
often uncoordinated efforts of different government departments and
agencies—and among Allies and partners—only magnify the problem.
To begin addressing these challenges, the US Joint Staff in 2018
published the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning. This publication
offers useful approaches and ideas for combating information-savvy
opponents through the development of new planning and campaigning
capabilities. It defines integrated campaigning as “Joint Force and
interorganizational partner efforts to enable the achievement and
maintenance of policy aims by integrating military activities and
aligning non-military activities of sufficient scope, scale, simultaneity,
and duration across multiple domains.”2
1. Robert S. Ehlers Jr. and Patrick Blannin, “Making Sense of the Information Environment,”
Small Wars Journal, March 3, 2020, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/making-sense
-information-environment.
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC), (Washington, DC:
JCS, March 16, 2018), v, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint
_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf ?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257.
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Integrated campaigning is indispensable for dealing effectively
with the new realities of conflict evident in the hyperconnected global
security environment and for gaining the initiative in prolonged
security problems.3 This article addresses the basic elements of
integrated campaigning and its utility for addressing long-duration
security challenges and information-savvy opponents. The article then
considers the value of integrated campaigning as a means for addressing
complex problems within the hyperconnected hyperconnected global
security environment and the utility of this type of campaigning to
planners. The article concludes with recommendations for structural and
organizational improvements to promote this more-effective approach
to planning and campaigning.

Planning Evolution

The attributes currently associated with military planning matured
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Prussian Great
General Staff was arguably the first highly sophisticated planning
organization focused on mobilization timetables, logistics, replacements,
and the most effective use of everything from the railroad and the
telegraph to breech-loading artillery and the machine gun.4 These new
approaches to planning grew out of changes in the character of war
driven by political, economic, and social realities.5
The Prussian planning model, adopted by other great powers
including the United States, worked well so long as the military
technological paradigm of the era—industrial warfare based on mass
conscription—remained the norm.6 The disasters of the world wars and
the development of atomic and nuclear weapons produced a paradigm
shift, but not a definitive one. NATO and the Warsaw Pact continued
to plan for major conventional war in Europe using tried and tested
planning processes, and their military forces appeared much like those
produced by earlier manifestations of the industrial warfare paradigm.7
The end of the Cold War and the Coalition victory in Operation
Desert Storm portended major changes in armed conflict. While
some called Desert Storm the last industrial war, others called it the
first information war. The war’s new computing and communications
technologies represented a clear evolution, altering the character of
that conflict in every way from the speed and precision of Coalition
3. Ehlers and Blannin, “Information Environment.”
4. Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1991), 1–17;
and Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” in
Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986), 299–302.
5. Bucholz, Moltke, 1–17.
6. Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy
in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 258–70.
7. Jan Hoffenaar and Christopher Findlay, eds., Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict
during the Cold War: An Oral History Roundtable, Stockholm, 24–25 April 2006, Zürcher Beiträge: Zur
Sicherheitspolitik, NR. 79 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, ETH), 46–56.
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maneuver to the lethality of its actions.8 But planning for Desert
Storm still involved a traditional, industrial-war approach: AirLand
Battle doctrine and planning processes, developed for war in Europe,
drove operations.9
With the development of the World Wide Web and rapid increases in
the speed of communications, events began outpacing the predominant
planning model. Counterinsurgencies and wars of national liberation
fought in the second half of the twentieth century had also exposed
shortcomings inherent in the model. When opponents refused to play by
prevailing rules and norms, the military advantages of the great powers
shrank or disappeared. In French Indochina, Algeria, and elsewhere,
David was often beating Goliath. These victories had more to do with
will and strategic patience than with military strength.10
Similarly, as people gained access to the Internet and began publishing
and disseminating narratives, hyperconnected, agile, message-savvy
“Davids” began emerging, drawing crowds and amassing influence and
power. The arrival of 3G and 4G transmission speeds and associated
Web-publishing tools made the late 1990s and early 2000s a watershed
period for this new kind of power. These trends are intensifying, giving
nonstate actors and states willing to break with conventional norms
major advantages in pursuing their strategic priorities. The dissemination
of 5G further intensifies this process.11
Countering these new forms of conflict reveals insufficiencies
in traditional planning processes. While constraints and restraints
hamstring American and Allied responses to technologically savvy
adversaries, the planning process itself is often the biggest culprit.
Planning tends to be episodic rather than continuous. Planning teams
are often ad hoc and temporary. Even when a good team comes together,
the assignments process almost immediately begins disassembling
it. Unfilled billets prevent formal changeover between outgoing
and incoming personnel, and in the name of security and efficiency,
communications specialists wipe the computer drives of departed staff.
These actions and the resulting loss of knowledge continuity produce
institutionalized inefficiency and ineffectiveness in planning and
lessons-learned processes.12
8. Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers,
and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, VA: Armed Forces Communications and
Electronics Association (AFCEA) International Press, 1992), 1–22.
9. Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Mariner
Books, 1994).
10. Gérard Chaliand, ed., Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to
Afghanistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
11. David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the
Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 3–13, 255–64.
12. Michael J. Mazaar et al., The U.S. Department of Defense’s Planning Process: Components and
Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), xii–xiii, 2–3, 32–40; and T. C. Greenwood
and T. X. Hammes, “War Planning for Wicked Problems,” Armed Forces Journal (2009), http://
armedforcesjournal.com/war-planning-for-wicked-problems/.
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The Centrality of Information
Contemporary conflict is particularly information dense and
transcends geographic boundaries in ways not previously possible.
As a result, multifunctional, multidomain campaigns are increasingly
complex. The central objective of what is now called information
warfare or operations in the information environment is to achieve
information advantage and decision superiority through nonlethal and
lethal operations, leading to an end state that supports strategic priorities.
But information advantage and decision superiority are temporary
conditions within a limited space. This boundedness makes coordinated
and synchronized actions, and the planning process required to develop
them, central to successful operations.13
Gaining advantage—producing the full range of effects and
objectives required to achieve end states—in today’s security challenges
requires a process integrated across all instruments of power, alliances,
and other collectivities. Often these challenges are persistent, highly
complex, and feature opponents well versed in the use of gray-zone
tactics—“intense political, economic, informational, and military
competition more fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy,
yet short of conventional war”—and other information-heavy
approaches. Accordingly, only a highly adaptive, flexible, and iterative
process of integrated campaigning offers any hope of long-term success.14
The linear, sequential, and highly centralized planning and campaign
development processes of the previous century cannot deliver the level
of agility and adaptability required to maintain an advantage in current
operating environments. Applying instruments of power deftly and in
coordination with whole-of-government and alliance actors requires a
planning approach that identifies common characteristics of diverse and
seemingly unrelated problem sets and aligns policy-driven end states
with shorter-term objectives and activities. This is where integrated
campaigning can be of the greatest value.
Integrated campaigning forgoes the “false dichotomy of peace and
war” or the existence of “artificially static environments that can be
broken into discrete campaigns with fixed end-states” by recognizing
“the need for proactive, ongoing campaigning that adjusts to fluid
policy environments and changing conditions to create favorable and
sustainable outcomes.”15 This adaptability allows policymakers and
commanders to understand, shape, and influence adversaries, partners,
and neutrals throughout enduring or discrete operations.
13. Ehlers and Blannin, “Information Environment”; and Eric X. Schaner, “What Are OIE?:
Definition and Functions,” Marine Corps Gazette 104, no. 4 (April 2020): 20–22, https://mca-marines
.org/wp-content/uploads/MCG-April-2020.pdf.
14. Joseph L. Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Force Quarterly 80,
no. 1 (1st Quarter 2016): 102, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-80/jfq
-80_101-109_Votel-et-al.pdf.
15. JCS, JCIC, iii.
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Crucially, integrated campaigning is ongoing. Supporting
organizational structures and processes must be established, including
cross-functional planning teams, formal and informal informationsharing networks, and information pass-along as members of planning
teams move to other assignments. Integrated campaigning must not be
episodic but instead constant and consistent in line with the evolving
problems it addresses.
Viewed through the lens of current planning processes, however,
campaign planning approaches across the competition continuum have
inherent contradictions. Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum,
states, “campaigning through cooperation is usually an enduring activity
with no discreet start or end point.”16 How does this direction align
with traditional ends-, ways-, and means-based planning? The efficacy
of cooperation-oriented activities can only be accurately assessed once
they are tested in a competitive environment. Consequently, planning
must remain proactive, not reactive. Also, while adaptability is key to
success in competitive environments, achieving long-term strategic
aims is the primary motivation and must inform planning, execution,
and assessment.
Additionally, constraints and restraints emerge from the same
precept upon which integrated campaigning is based. Domestic and
international law apply the distinction between peace and war to
legitimize, rationalize, and regulate the use of force. The transition to
a state of war—declared or undeclared—also justifies the allocation
of resources coinciding with an increase in acceptable risk. For an
institution as large as the US Department of Defense, it is easier to treat
these matters in distinct categories rather than on a complex sliding
scale. Are the existing legal and institutional advantages of the artificial
and simplistic peace/war binary compatible with the multidimensional
complex sliding scale now characterizing competition and conflict?17
Moreover, what is the role of the military in an environment
characterized by multidimensional complexity?
Despite these potential limitations, integrated campaign planning
and its ultimate result, integrated campaigning, enable commanders
to excel in armed conflict, and ideally short of it, through the skillful
application of whole-of-government cooperation and competition
strategies. Commanders must be alert to the tension between military and
other instruments of power and strive continuously for proper balance.
Perhaps most important, integrated campaigning reduces the
difficulty of operating in the hyperconnected global security environment
by enabling information maneuver in coordination with more traditional
physical forms of maneuver. State and nonstate actors are becoming
adept at articulating the concept of information maneuver. They
16. JCS, Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-19 (Washington, DC: JCS,
June 3, 2019), vi, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf; and
JCS, JCIC, 7.
17. JCS, JCIC, 31–32.
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recognize how continuous, integrated, well-timed, and well-targeted
shaping and influence actions enable combined effects at the wholeof-government and whole-of-nation levels and enable combined-arms
effects at the military level. Employing properly targeted information
in the right places and times, against the right audiences, either in
conjunction with physical force or independent of it, is crucial in the
hyperconnected hyperconnected global security environment. Our
adversaries understand this concept.
Consequently, in the face of a militarily superior United States,
other players work to achieve strategic aims through gray-zone
activities. Russia, for example, has developed a range of nonmilitary and
quasi-military capabilities and tasks not normally assigned to Western
militaries. The Russian Federation’s use of reflexive control and its
associated activities is a case in point.18 Russian operations in Georgia,
Crimea, and Ukraine have made full use of these capabilities to throw
opponents off balance and keep them on the defensive in the battle for
narrative and physical dominance.19
During a crisis, doing something is often seen as imperative. This
bias for action frequently results in the military becoming the default
responder.20 If timely action is a priority, the military can effectively be
brought to bear, as other instruments of power are rarely as responsive.
But the nonintegrated deployment of military assets rarely delivers
sound, long-term solutions to crises, making imperative a synchronized
whole-of-government approach.21 In this way, other instruments of
power can set the conditions to make military efforts either unnecessary
or more effective. Russia has moved in this direction, as has China with
its “Informationized Warfare” and “Three Warfares” approaches.22
China continues to enhance its information warfare capabilities and
build its information advantage, emphasizing operations designed to
weaken an enemy force’s command and control systems.23 The People’s
Liberation Army has boosted its multi-domain, anti-access/area-denial
18. Michael Holloway, “How Russia Weaponized Social Media in Crimea,” Real Clear
Defense, May 10, 2017, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/05/10/how_russia
_weaponized_social_media_in_crimea_111352.html; and Keir Giles, James Sherr, and Anthony
Seaboyer, Russian Reflexive Control (Kingston, Ontario: Royal Military College of Canada, October
2018), 13–23, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328562833_Russian_Reflexive_Control.
19. Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” reprinted in Military
Review (January–February 2016): 23–29, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military
-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160228_art008.pdf.
20. Robert Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense
[DoD], February 6, 2006), 86, https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.
21. John J. Frewen, “A Bias for Action? The Military as an Element of National Power,” in New
Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0: ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre’s Golden Anniversary Conference
Proceedings, ed. Russell W. Glenn (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2018), 44.
22. Dean Cheng, Cyber Dragon: Inside China’s Information Warfare and Cyber Operations, The
Changing Face of War, edited by James Jay Carafano (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2017), 37–53.
23. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power,
Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act: Annual Report on the Military Power of the
People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: OSD, 2004), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military
/library/report/2004/d20040528prc.pdf.
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capabilities.24 China is also improving its cyber capabilities, including
computer network attacks, electronic warfare, and information
blockades of its computer networks. Chinese leaders realize how
important emerging technologies are to national success. Artificial
intelligence, for example, has assumed a major role in Beijing’s ambitious
Made in China 2025 plan. This technology-based blueprint details a threephase strategy to maintain market share in 2020, develop significant
breakthroughs by 2025, and dominate the sector (along with nine other
high-tech sectors) by 2030.25
Although their playbooks differ, Russian and Chinese means
for obtaining and leveraging the initiative in conflict and gray-zone
competition derive from their understanding that using and manipulating
information more rapidly and effectively than their opponents offers
major advantages. These approaches spring from a deep contextual
understanding of the problem, its key players, and how changes in
the speed and ubiquity of information flows have altered planning
and operational requirements. Moreover, Russia and China can move
unpredictably, execute operations rapidly, and fail fast without severe
internal political ramifications, which makes them more risk tolerant.
Although Russian and Chinese activities have elicited a range of
punitive responses, their governments arguably have mitigated the
impacts by co-opting whole-of-nation capabilities as force multipliers
in an enduring and scalable manner. Acknowledging this reality is
important because the West has difficulty replicating such whole-ofnation capabilities for structural, legal, and moral reasons. Adopting an
integrated campaigning mindset, however, may facilitate development
of the whole-of-nation effects leveraged by Russia and China. Integrated
campaigning will also facilitate more effective whole-of-alliance (or
coalition) actions using all instruments of power in a coordinated,
synchronized, and interactive manner.
Understanding both the major impacts of information on the
contemporary global security environment and how our principal
opponents use that information to gain advantage in specific situations
makes it possible to understand not only why integrated campaign
planning and integrated campaigning are vital, but also how these
concepts might best be operationalized.

Operationalizing Integrated Planning and Campaigning

The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning begins with a warning:
The United States is in a worldwide competition with emerging and
resurgent global powers, aspiring regional hegemons, and non-state actors

24. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University,
Countering Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges: Strategies and Capabilities, Event Report (Singapore:
RSIS, December 1, 2017), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ER180424
_Countering-Anti-Access.pdf.
25. People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council, Made in China 2025 (Beijing: PRC State
Council, July 7, 2015), http://www.cittadellascienza.it/cina/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/IoT
-ONE-Made-in-China-2025.pdf.
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seeking to challenge aspects of the post-World War II international order.
For the foreseeable future, adversaries will continue to creatively combine
conventional and non-conventional methods to achieve their objectives.
Many will operate below a threshold that invokes a direct military response
from the United States while retaining the capability to escalate to more
conventional armed conflict if desired.26

To meet these challenges, the United States and its Allies and
partners must engage in Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and
multinational integrated campaigning across all instruments of
power. The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning defines integrated
campaigning as, “Joint Force and interorganizational partner efforts to
enable the achievement and maintenance of policy aims by integrating
military activities and aligning nonmilitary activities of sufficient
scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration across multiple domains.”27
Its “foundational idea” is “to enable an expanded view of the operational
environment by proposing the notion of a competition continuum. This
competition continuum offers an alternative to the old peace/war binary
with a new model of cooperation, competition below armed conflict,
and armed conflict. These are not mutually exclusive but rather states of
relationships with other actors that can exist concurrently.”28
To develop and practice integrated planning and campaigning,
four actions are required: understanding the problem and its associated
operating environment through the lens of the competition continuum;
constructing iterative campaigns using a design process that coordinates
and deconflicts military and nonmilitary activities; employing force and
securing gains in campaigns tailored to the operational environment;
and assessing and adapting campaigns based on objectives aligned with
strategic priorities.29
These approaches signal a fundamental shift in what planning
entails. Specifically, planning must become an integrated, long-term,
continuous process operating in parallel with the integrated campaigning
it sets in motion. This effort requires planners to monitor continually
the progress made in achieving objectives and end states.
Achieving this combination is challenging. The process revolves
around the core of a clearly articulated mission and a well-defined (and
achievable) end state. The Australian Defence Force’s Information War:
ADF Manoeuvre in the Information Environment, JDN 1-20 emphasizes,
“defence against threats generated in the IE [information environment]
requires a national strategic narrative.”30 Unlike the United States,
however, the Australian government does not produce a national
security strategy to articulate a national security-oriented strategic
narrative nested within a grand strategy. There is no “over-arching
26. JCS, JCIC, 5.
27. JCS, JCIC, 5.
28. JCS, JCIC, 6.
29. JCS, JCIC, 5–6.
30. Australian Department of Defence (ADoD), Information War: ADF Manoeuvre in the
Information Environment, JDN 1-20 (Canberra: Joint Doctrine Directorate, 2020), 5.15.
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controlling national policy or architecture . . . to [facilitate] contest in
the IE.”31 Similarly problematic is the American tendency not to act in
accordance with its national security strategy.
Viewed through the lens of the hyperconnected global security
environment and its dynamics, the imperatives for effective and
achievable strategic aims, coordinated policy formulation, effective
policy execution, and strategic patience all drive requirements for major
changes in planning and operations. This new mindset will support
the rapid, effective, and persistent integration of operations across the
cognitive, physical, and informational domains to achieve integrated
campaigning objectives.
The combination of inertia brought on by decades of traditional
planning processes, legal and ethical constraints, and the relative freedom
of action of adversaries and competitors all present challenges. Together,
they make translating planning and operational improvements into
effective integrated campaigning difficult. In fact, developing mature
and capable integrated campaign planning and campaigning processes
requires a paradigm shift in the structures and processes of planning
organizations themselves.32

From Concept to Practice

Campaign plans seek to shape the operational environment and
achieve national objectives.33 These plans establish operations, activities,
and investments to achieve objectives in support of strategic priorities.
Objectives must be continuously assessed. As they are achieved (or
determined to be infeasible), decisionmakers update the plans with new
objectives and assessment measures. Integrated campaigning includes
operations across the spectrum of conflict, creating opportunities to
affect the operational environment favorably.
Campaign planning identifies means to achieve specific effects and
objectives. By extension, integrated campaign plans seek to capitalize
on the cumulative effect of multiple coordinated and synchronized
operations, effects, activities, and investments that cannot be
accomplished by a single operation. This approach facilitates integrated
campaigning with a continuous, coordinated planning process executed
in parallel with the operations it sets in motion.34
The implications of this approach, specifically for long-term
problems, are important. Setting conditions is vital to campaign
planning because it involves a range of whole-of-government and
international factors shaping the problem. Shaping and influencing target
audiences, steadily and well ahead of the problem becoming a crisis, is
31. ADoD, JDN 1-20, 5–21.
32. Marcus Thompson, “Information Warfare – A New Age?,” (speech, iWar Five Eyes
Principals’ Forum, Australian Defence Force Headquarters, Canberra, October 31–November 1,
2018).
33. DoD, Joint Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (2017), I-1.
34. DoD, JCIC, 1–8.
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imperative. Accordingly, integrated campaign planning relies heavily on
continuous war gaming, red teaming, and assessment, all of which help
decisionmakers stay ahead of problems, anticipate major developments,
and gain initiative over time as integrated campaigning continues. The
line between planning and operations is increasingly blurry precisely
because planning and operations occur simultaneously over long periods.
Trying to gain the initiative and achieve continuing advantage involves
parallel efforts along with careful phasing and sequencing.
Unlike deliberate planning, which produces operational plans
that may or may not be executed in the future, integrated campaign
planning addresses ongoing, complex problems that require constant
engagement. A similar dynamic pertains when comparing integrated
campaign planning with crisis action planning. While the latter addresses
an immediate problem and will often be executed, such planning begins
and ends at specific points in time, while integrated campaign planning
and the integrated campaigning it supports continue for the duration of
the problem.
Iterative planning and assessment, along with frequent and realistic
war gaming and red teaming, facilitate plan development, operations,
and the continuous updates required to stay ahead of opponents. The
feedback loops and other observe-orient-decide-act aspects of this
dynamic are often intensely negative for the party falling behind.
Important changes in structures and processes associated with this
aspect of integrated campaign planning include establishing standing and
multidisciplinary planning groups with a long-term focus on security
problems and high levels of understanding regarding those problems.
These planning groups require human-machine interfaces that provide
advanced data analytics to help planners understand how the problem is
evolving, identify possible solutions, and select a viable course of action.
Condition setting, continuous assessment during parallel planning
and execution, and updating campaign plans faster and more effectively
than opponents all maximize the probability of addressing problems
successfully and short of armed conflict. Long-term shaping and
influencing to place an opponent in a position of relative disadvantage is
vital, as is the battle for the loyalty of partners, neutrals, and others in the
court of global public opinion. Alienating these groups with an approach
too reliant on the threat of physical force and too light on information
mass and maneuver will erode support and endanger relationships with
potential partners. Nonlethal approaches and actions are well worth the
effort, and continuously and methodically planning for them is at least
as important as planning for lethal actions.

Key Aspects and Recommendations

The foregoing discussion of planning for long-term complex
problems provided the general approaches, structures, and processes
necessary for effective planning and operations in the hyperconnected
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global security environment. The most important of these best practices
can be summarized as follows.
Persistence. Integrated campaign planning must be continuous. Unlike
conventional plans, integrated campaign planning changes constantly
because it occurs in parallel with the integrated campaigning it supports.
The requirements for persistence in information-centric planning
parallel the rapid flow of information itself as well as the fast-paced
shifts in behavior and initiative such information flow drives. Speed
requires a speedy antidote, or at least a persistent and timely one, and
this begins with the planning process.
Standing planning groups. Multidisciplinary standing planning groups,
comprised of the best available people by skill set and experience,
are indispensable for integrated campaign planning and integrated
campaigning. The Israeli Defense Force Spokesperson’s Unit and its realtime media center compose one case in point. While this organization is
an operations center designed to counter and provide dueling narratives
and messages, the deeper function that allows this activity is persistent
and time-sensitive planning by the right groups of people.35 The need
for standing planning groups applies to problems as urgent as Israel’s
conflicts with Hamas and as long term and gradual as those involving
China and Russia.
Organizational structure and processes. An organization’s structure
and processes must facilitate persistent, well-informed, and wellstaffed planning. While the Joint (J-code) structure accomplishes
this integration in limited ways, it is far from ideal for addressing
long-term, complex problems, especially those with high operational
tempos. The key shortcoming within the J-code structure is not the
number of J-code directorates but the paucity of truly integrated teams
dedicated to working specific problems over long time periods. This
close and persistent integration of personnel in permanent spaces—
rather than coming together occasionally on neutral ground—is key to
integrated campaigning.
Time and depth. Certain numbers of US military officers need to
be generalists—as in “general officers.” The rest of the officer corps
needs greater time and depth in specific, long-term problem sets much
like their enlisted and civilian counterparts who are generally hired
to provide deep expertise and continuity. Practical solutions to this
challenge of time and depth can be found by updating the military
personnel assignments process. While less than 1 percent of officers will
reach flag rank, the majority are developed professionally as though they
might. While this professional development opens a wider window for
the selection of flag officers, it drastically reduces the aggregate time and
depth officers have in any given problem set or area of specialty. The “up
or out” system is not very effective in the current security environment.
35. Neal Ungerleider, “Inside the Israeli Military’s Social Media Squad,” Fast Company,
November 20, 2012, https://www.fastcompany.com/3003305/inside-israeli-militarys-social-media
-squad; and Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters, 63–90.
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Whole-of-government approach. No aspect of integrated campaigning is
less well developed. Because most problems in the global security arena
are long term, highly complex, and reliant on an all-instruments-ofpower approach, no single instrument of national power will suffice
to deal with them. Unfortunately, whole-of-government approaches are
limited in scope and are the exception rather than the norm. Cultural
and contextual differences account for much of this nonintegration, and
the current hyperpartisanship only exacerbates the problem. Standing,
cross-functional planning teams must include long-term participants
from all interested agencies and departments sitting in common spaces
and working at an all-instruments-of-power level. This comprehensive
approach is the basis of effective interagency coordination, civil-military
cooperation, Joint and multinational operations, and the effective use
of structures such as Joint interagency coordination groups and Joint
interagency task forces.
Engagements with nongovernmental experts. Because limited numbers
of real experts in a given problem set reside within the government,
planners must seek insight from business, academic, professional,
humanitarian, and other entities with relevant interests. These
relationships must be cultivated over time and at the organizational level
to build mutual understanding and cooperation.
Advanced and basic planning tools. The rapid development of advanced
data analytics and artificial intelligence technologies is changing how
humans understand and engage with complex problems. While technology
is not a substitute for human interaction and interconnections, it is
moving in that direction. Planning teams need a combination of the latest
interactive technologies along with the venerable and still indispensable
whiteboards and butcher-block paper. These legacy methods facilitate
a more creative and interactive planning process even as cutting-edge
tools enhance analytical insights.

Conclusion

Today the national interests, citizens, and territories of the United
States and its Allies and partners are threatened in every operating
domain by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons
proliferation, global terrorism, unconventional threats, and challenges
from adversaries. Working within this highly complex environment,
planners must learn to engage in integrated campaign planning,
and their operational counterparts in integrated campaigning. To
succeed, planners and operators must embrace the realities of this
security environment, including its complex informational aspects,
and operate with clarity from within. The hyperconnected global
security environment of today mandates a flexible, adaptive approach to
military planning and ever-greater cooperation between all the elements
of national power, coordinated with that of our Allies, partners,
and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional
security organizations.
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